Introduction
Agricultural market access is a highly controversial issue in the current WTO policy debate. According to the latest proposals of the EU, the USA, the G-20 and the G-33, the positions on market access differ strongly and thus the success of the upcoming Hong Kong negotiations is evidently put at risk. 2 The most contentious issues concerning market access are: What magnitude of tariff cuts should be made? What kind of tiered formula should be implemented? Should tariffs be capped? How should the number and width of tariff bands be handled? Should there be flexibility within the tariff bands? How many products should be defined as sensitive? What degree of Special and Differential Treatment (SDT) should be required? How should Tariff Rate Quotas (TRQs) be handled? The answers to these questions will determine the magnitude of the market access which will be granted by WTO member countries and is still a moving target in the WTO negotiations.
This paper addresses some of the questions raised above. Based on the analysis we show how much the trade balance of the EU-27 changes if different tariff cutting options to open market access are applied. We ask whether industrialized countries (ICs), developing countries (DCs), least developed countries (LDCs) or non-WTO member countries (ROW) take advantage of the enlarged EU market access. Furthermore, the most sensitive variables for market access for different product groups will be identified. Section 2 of the paper begins by discussing the variables relevant for market access. Section 3 introduces the extended Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) model which is used as the methodological instrument for the calculations. Empirical results are discussed in Section 4. Section 5 concludes the paper.
Variables to Enlarge Market Access
The Doha Work Programme commits the WTO members to enlarge market access on the basis of a tiered tariff formula that grants higher cuts for higher tariffs (WTO, 2004) . Member countries have already decided on a complex concept to convert non ad valorem tariffs, e.g. specific and mixed tariffs, to ad valorem equivalents (AVEs). Beyond that, not much has been decided yet, so the list of open questions concerning the tariff cuts to open market access is rather long. The magnitude of these tariff cuts is one of the most contentious issues in the negotiations. Jean et al. (2005) found that only large tariff cuts would have a major impact on market access. They identified the difference between bound and applied tariff rates as the main reason for this result.
Although the use of a tiered formula is already decided, some leeway exists to implement this formula. It can be imposed as a linear formula with linear cuts between the bands, comparable with the Harbinson proposal (WTO, 2003) . This approach gives rise to the problem of discontinuity which results in a change of the ordering of tariffs. From the political-economy perspective, such discontinuities would create political resistance from firms which are just above the transition points (Anderson and Martin, 2005a, p.16 Another open question in the WTO negotiations is the degree of flexibility within each formula.
Formulas which only target an average reduction have high flexibility. These formulas allow governments to shift the burden of the tariff reduction from one sector to another (Bureau and Salvatici, 2004, p.5) . Abreu (1996) shows with manufactures that the average tariff cutting rule used in the Uruguay Round (1986-94) has lead to small cuts in sectors with high tariffs. He identifies the same sectors as the most important ones for least developed countries. High flexibility could be reduced by increasing the number of tariff bands in combination with a smaller width of these tariff bands. Also, more tariff bands could reduce the problem of discontinuity.
Another controversial issue in the negotiations is the number of sensitive products. This issue has been analyzed by Jean et al. (2005) . They found that even allowing two percent of the 6-digit tariff lines in developed countries to be classified as sensitive would dramatically reduce the effectiveness of tariff reductions. Whether or not to impose a maximum tariff or a tariff cap is another undecided issue. Here, Jales et al. (2005) shows that a low level cap does not improve trade, because most of the high tariffs are little other than import bans. Concerning tariff rate quotas, de Gorter and Kliauga (2005) found that a reduction of the out-of-quota tariffs increases trade much more than an expansion of tariff rate quotas. Jales et al. (2005) pointed out that expansion of TRQs is only a second best option for liberalization because they are not transparent
and not an efficient way to increase market access.
Most of the studies mentioned above do not take intersectoral and interregional effects of tariff cutting options into account. Also, comparisons of different options for market access are not well documented in the literature. In particular, different numbers and width of tariff bands or different tiered formulas have not been analyzed in a comparable manner. In the following sections we try to partly close this gap in literature.
Empirical Model
The analyses in this paper are based on the comparative static standard multi regional general represented by price wedges. The framework of the standard GTAP model is well documented in the GTAP book (Hertel, 1997) and available on the Internet (www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu).
Extensions of the Model
Agricultural policy instruments are represented via price wedges in the Standard GTAP model. (EAGGF) as well as the net transfer between EU member countries. Here, we followed the approach of Brockmeier et al. (2005) .
Besides changes in the political environment of an economy, macroeconomic developments such as technical progress influence its growth. In order to take these changes into account, corresponding trends are incorporated into this analysis. For this purpose an approach by van Tongeren and Huang (2004) is used which allows the inclusion of exogenous projections of global and regional GDP and factor endowments into the extended GTAP model. In the simulations, technical progress is generated endogenously by the model to produce the projected growth pattern.
Extension of the Data Base
The most recent GTAP database (Version 6.04) includes applied tariffs which are based on the Market Access Map (MAcMap). The source files of MAcMap come from TRAINS, the WTO and the AMAD databases. 4 The applied rates of the newest GTAP database take preferences,
AVEs and TRQs into account. Information on preferences is taken from the TRAINS database
and is augmented with data from national sources. AVEs are calculated on the basis of the median unit value of world wide exporters using an average flow of the years 2000 to 2003. Finally, TRQs are taking into account utilizing the fill rate from the AMAD database. If the fill rate is less than 90%, the in-quota tariff is used. The out-of-quota rate is employed if the fill rate is higher than 100%. If the fill rate is higher than 90%, but smaller than 100%, a simple average of the in-quota and out-of-quota rate is applied (BOUËT et al., 2004) .
However, comparable bound rates at the 6 digit or at the GTAP database aggregation level are not yet publicly available. Accordingly, the GTAP database used for calculations in this paper is extended by bound tariff data. Tariff data up to the 10 digit level is provided by the Economic
Research Service (ERS) of the USDA. This includes agricultural ad valorem and non ad valorem bound tariffs from Chapters 1-24 of the Harmonized System 1996 (HS96). Specific tariffs are converted into AVEs based on average world import unit values (Gibson et al., 2001, p. 6) . Tariff data provided at the 8 or 10 digit levels are aggregated to the 6 digit level using the simple average. 5 However, all 2, 4 or 6 digit tariffs are aggregated to the GTAP level using import trade weights. This is done with the help of source generic world import values from the COMTRADE database for the year 2001 excluding intra-EU trade.
Import weighting is the most commonly used aggregation scheme, also utilized to aggregate the applied rates included in the GTAP database version 6.04. Advantageously, trade weights take the relative importance of trade flows into account. Furthermore, the welfare implications are better addressed with this method. In contrast, the import weighted aggregation scheme leads to an endogeneity bias, as the weight for every individual tariff decreases with an increase of the tariff. Accordingly, prohibitive tariffs impeding market access, and thereby reducing the trade volumes to zero, are not taken into account by import weighting. Trade barriers are therefore underestimated with this method. 
Calculation of Tariff Cuts
WTO negotiations are based on bound rates, while the economic effect of a tariff cut depends on the applied rate. Therefore, our calculations of tariff cuts are based on bound and applied rates.
The difference between bound and applied duties is called water in the tariffs. This procedure was used due to missing data on bilateral trade values at the 8 or 10 digit level. 6
In contrast to this study, Walkenhorst and Dihel (2003) used simple averages for the tariff aggregation to avoid biases from the interdependence of tariff levels and trade flows. The simple non weighted average, however, does not take the relative importance of particular tariffs into account. 7
There is disagreement over the definition of the term "water in the tariffs" in the literature. For example, Martin and Wang (2004) define water in the tariffs as any gap between the applied rate and the actual rate of protection, where the actual rate is lower. Additionally, the term "water in the tariffs" is not equivalent to the term "binding overhang" which defines the difference between the bound and the MFN rate (Francois and Martin, 2003) . 8
Due to unavailable information we do not take effective protection into account. However, it should be stressed that an implemented tariff cut will not result in a trade effect if it leaves the applied rate above the effective protection (Podbury and Roberts, 2003, p. 5 T , the tariff cut to achieve 1 br T = 1 ar T will be implemented according to equation (2): Water in the tariffs will lead to country-specific reduction commitments. Due to the ceiling binding option in the Uruguay Round, developing countries were allowed to implement the tariff binding without reference to former protection levels. As a result, the bound tariffs in developing countries are much higher than in developed countries (Anderson and Martin, 2005a, pp. 14) .
Therefore, developing countries might experience an implicit preferential treatment that might be added to the already granted special and differential treatment.
Experiments
The base run of the simulations represents a projection of population, GDP and factor endow- The Doha Work Programme leaves a lot of room for speculation on how market access will be improved through agricultural trade negotiations. Thus, in the following six experiments, some of the variables still under negotiation (as discussed in Section 2) will be varied to see how they affect the outcome of the Doha round. Table 1 therefore shows three different variants for tariff bands, representing widened (1), shrunken (2) and a reduced number of bands (3). Additionally, Table 1 presents variations of tariff cuts classified as low (A) and high (B) as well as tariff cuts adapted to a lower number of tariff bands (C).
In Table 2 we demonstrate how the six experiments are formed using the variations of tariff bands and cuts, different kind of formulas and the option of capping. The experiments are put together in such a way that Experiments 2 to 6 only differ from Experiment 1 in one variable.
Additionally, we implemented a tariff cut for non-agricultural commodities of 50% and 33% in the IC and the DC, respectively. Export subsidies are also eliminated in all experiments, while it is assumed that the EU direct payments qualify for the green box and are therefore kept un- 
Results
This section discusses the results of the six experiments. In analyzing the effects of different options for expanding market access, we mainly focus on the changes of the EU-27 trade balances and whether ICs, DCs, LDCs 9 or the non-WTO member countries (ROW) are able to take advantage of the enlarged EU market access. Due to limited space we further restrict the discussion of the results to the main products of the EU-27. Results are presented in millions of US$ for the year 2001 of the GTAP database. The calculations are based on the software GEMPACK (Version 9.0), RunGTAP and AnalyseGE (Harrison and Pearson, 1996) . A fixed trade balance is adopted as the macroeconomic closure in all experiments.
In Table 3 we display the change in the regional trade balance by commodity for the Experiments 1 to 6. 10 An examination of Table 3 The sugar sector's reaction to the implementation of the Doha round is somewhat different. Here, the relative increase of EU sugar imports is accompanied by a loss in the LDCs' and mostly also the ICs' sugar trade balance arising from preference erosion and the high tariff cuts respectively.
A comparison of Experiment 1 with Experiments 4, 5 and 6 shows the highly protected sugar sector is invariant to the width of the tariff bands, the capping and the number of tariff bands.
The size of changes is only reduced in Experiments 2 and 3 where the progressive formula leads to lower tariff cuts or lower tariff cuts are implemented. Table 3 also shows negative changes for the EU trade balance of milk products in all experiments (US$ -10,126 to -10,980 million). These are almost unchanged between experiments and are therefore indifferent to variations in tariff cuts and bands, the implemented formula and the capping. Consequently, the relative increase of EU milk imports to exports can mainly be attributed to the elimination of EU export subsidies. Again, all third countries show positive changes of their trade balances for milk which remain more or less unchanged in the DCs and the LDCs (compare Experiment 1 to 6). Nevertheless, the DCs can obviously be identified as the main milk surplus producer, gaining as much as US$ 7,403 million in Experiment 4. The remaining relative increase in exports is distributed to ICs and the ROW. In contrast to the EU, the ICs are re-sponsive to lower tariff cuts, the more moderate progressive formula and shrunken tariff bands, so that their milk surplus increases from Experiment 1 to Experiments 2, 3 and 4, respectively. In contrast, the reduced number of bands in Experiment 6 apparently leads to higher tariff cuts in ICs which in turn reduces the gain of US$ 1,527 million from Experiment 1 to US$ 1,380 million. The remaining trade gain is always absorbed by the non-participating ROW. 1) IC = industrialized countries, DC = developing countries, LDC = least developed countries, ROW = non-WTO member countries
Source:
Own calculations. Where does the negative development of the EU trade balance for cereal and other meat in Experiment 3 come from? A more detailed analysis can be conducted based on the decomposition which splits the total change of the trade balance in its single components (compare Harrison et al., 1999) . These represent the so-called subtotals that are attributable to changes in individual exogenous variables, e.g., the tariff cuts. Table 4 Table   3 ). Table 4 also reveals the opposite effect in Experiment 3, where lower tariff cuts only result in small displacements of EU cereal exports (US$ -88 million).
Finally, Table 4 presents the effects of EU tariff cuts for third countries' agricultural products as well as the third countries' tariff cuts for EU agricultural products. While the latter is only of smaller size, the former compensates the negative effect of tariff cuts between third countries most of the time. At first sight, it is difficult to understand why the cut of EU import tariffs has a positive effect on the EU trade balance for cereals, viz. US$ 343 million in Experiment 1. For this reason, Figure 3 presents a further decomposition of this effect for Experiment 1. Figure 3 discloses that the cut of EU import tariffs for cereals undoubtedly has a negative effect on the EU trade balance for cereals (US$ -100 million). However, the tariff cuts for all the other EU agricultural products, particularly for beef (US$ 291 million), has a positive effect on the EU trade balance for cereals. In sum, these positive effects outweigh the negative effect of the cut of the relatively low EU tariff for cereals. Table 4 also presents a decomposition of the results for the EU trade balance for other meat.
Here, the effect of the elimination of EU export subsidies plays a major role and goes along with a negative effect of tariff cuts between third countries. The latter is particularly high in those experiments which implement high tariff cuts. It amounts to US$ -5,180 million in Experiment 4
where high cuts are implemented using shrunken bands. It is interesting to note that high tariff cuts also considerably increase the possibility for the EU to export other meat to third countries, mainly to ICs (compare also Table 3 ). In Experiment 4 this results in a positive effect of the EU trade balance for other meat of US$ 10,787 million.
However, comparing Experiment 1 with Experiments 4, 5 and 6, it can be stated that the width and the number of the tariff bands, as well as capping, is not of significant importance for the EU trade balance of other meat nor for third countries.
Conclusion
The negotiations on agricultural market access are a central issue in the Doha Round. This paper analyses the economic effects of different magnitudes of tariff cuts, different tariff cutting formulas, the implications of tariff capping as well as different numbers and width of tariff bands.
The simulations are conducted with an extended version of the GTAP model. Furthermore, an extended version of the GTAP data base (6.0) including bound and applied rates is used.
The results reveal that the EU-27 experiences a negative change of its trade balance in the highly protected beef and sugar sectors. The relative increase of EU beef and sugar imports is mainly evoked by the magnitude of tariff cuts and, to a lesser extent, by the kind of formula used to implement the tariff cuts. In contrast, the EU trade balance for milk and cereals is hardly influenced by different options to cut tariffs. Here, the negative change of the trade balance is mainly driven by the elimination of export subsidies. The results also indicate a relative increase of EU exports for other meat, if tariff cuts are high enough to open third countries' markets to the EU.
Who will reap the advantage from an improved EU market access induced by the WTO negotiations? From the non-participating LDCs and ROW points of view it does not make much of a difference whether tariff cuts are high or implemented with different formulas, numbers and width of tariff bands. They only realize a minor trade gain. Additionally, the LDCs suffer from preference erosion in the sugar sector which increases with higher tariff cuts. In contrast, DCs are able to disproportionately increase their beef, sugar and cereal exports to the EU, if higher tariff cuts are implemented. A different tariff cutting formula, varying numbers and width of tariff bands and capping, however, does not lead to a significantly higher access of DCs to the EU market.
